Files
impala/shell/TSSLSocketWithWildcardSAN.py
Sailesh Mukil 45ff0f9e67 IMPALA-3159: impala-shell does not accept wildcard or SAN certificates
The impala-shell could not accept wildcard or SAN certificates
previously as the thrift library it depended on did not support them.
This patch subclasses TSSLSocket and adds the logic to take care of
the above mentioned cases by introducing the new
TSSLSocketWithWildcardSAN class.

The certificate matching logic is based on the python-ssl source code.

Added custom cluster tests to test both wildcard matching and SAN
matching.

Added be/src/testutil/certificates-info.txt which contains all the
information about the certificates which are added for the tests.

This has been tested with Python2.4 and Python2.6.

Change-Id: I75e37012eeeb0bcf87a5edf875f0ff915daf8b89
Reviewed-on: http://gerrit.cloudera.org:8080/3765
Reviewed-by: Sailesh Mukil <sailesh@cloudera.com>
Tested-by: Internal Jenkins
2016-07-26 02:44:25 +00:00

150 lines
5.3 KiB
Python

#!/usr/bin/env python
# Copyright 2016 Cloudera Inc.
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
import re
from thrift.transport import TSSLSocket
from thrift.transport.TTransport import TTransportException
class CertificateError(ValueError):
"""Convenience class to raise errors"""
pass
class TSSLSocketWithWildcardSAN(TSSLSocket.TSSLSocket):
"""
This is a subclass of thrift's TSSLSocket which has been extended to add the missing
functionality of validating wildcard certificates and certificates with SANs
(subjectAlternativeName).
The core of the validation logic is based on the python-ssl library:
See <https://svn.python.org/projects/python/tags/r32/Lib/ssl.py>
"""
def __init__(self,
host='localhost',
port=9090,
validate=True,
ca_certs=None,
unix_socket=None):
TSSLSocket.TSSLSocket.__init__(self, host, port, validate, ca_certs, unix_socket)
def _validate_cert(self):
cert = self.handle.getpeercert()
self.peercert = cert
if 'subject' not in cert:
raise TTransportException(
type=TTransportException.NOT_OPEN,
message='No SSL certificate found from %s:%s' % (self.host, self.port))
try:
self._match_hostname(cert, self.host)
self.is_valid = True
return
except CertificateError, ce:
raise TTransportException(
type=TTransportException.UNKNOWN,
message='Certificate error with remote host: %s' % (ce))
raise TTransportException(
type=TTransportException.UNKNOWN,
message='Could not validate SSL certificate from '
'host "%s". Cert=%s' % (self.host, cert))
def _match_hostname(self, cert, hostname):
"""Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by
SSLSocket.getpeercert()) matches the *hostname*. RFC 2818 and RFC 6125
rules are followed, but IP addresses are not accepted for *hostname*.
CertificateError is raised on failure. On success, the function
returns nothing.
"""
dnsnames = []
san = cert.get('subjectAltName', ())
for key, value in san:
if key == 'DNS':
if self._dnsname_match(value, hostname):
return
dnsnames.append(value)
if not dnsnames:
# The subject is only checked when there is no dNSName entry
# in subjectAltName
for sub in cert.get('subject', ()):
for key, value in sub:
# XXX according to RFC 2818, the most specific Common Name
# must be used.
if key == 'commonName':
if self._dnsname_match(value, hostname):
return
dnsnames.append(value)
if len(dnsnames) > 1:
raise CertificateError("hostname %r "
"doesn't match either of %s"
% (hostname, ', '.join(map(repr, dnsnames))))
elif len(dnsnames) == 1:
raise CertificateError("hostname %r "
"doesn't match %r"
% (hostname, dnsnames[0]))
else:
raise CertificateError("no appropriate commonName or "
"subjectAltName fields were found")
def _dnsname_match(self, dn, hostname, max_wildcards=1):
"""Matching according to RFC 6125, section 6.4.3
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
"""
pats = []
if not dn:
return False
# Ported from python3-syntax:
# leftmost, *remainder = dn.split(r'.')
parts = dn.split(r'.')
leftmost = parts[0]
remainder = parts[1:]
wildcards = leftmost.count('*')
if wildcards > max_wildcards:
# Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more
# than one wildcard per fragment. A survey of established
# policy among SSL implementations showed it to be a
# reasonable choice.
raise CertificateError(
"too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: " + repr(dn))
# speed up common case w/o wildcards
if not wildcards:
return dn.lower() == hostname.lower()
# RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1.
# The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in which
# the wildcard character comprises a label other than the left-most label.
if leftmost == '*':
# When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless
# fragment.
pats.append('[^.]+')
elif leftmost.startswith('xn--') or hostname.startswith('xn--'):
# RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3.
# The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier
# where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or
# U-label of an internationalized domain name.
pats.append(re.escape(leftmost))
else:
# Otherwise, '*' matches any dotless string, e.g. www*
pats.append(re.escape(leftmost).replace(r'\*', '[^.]*'))
# add the remaining fragments, ignore any wildcards
for frag in remainder:
pats.append(re.escape(frag))
pat = re.compile(r'\A' + r'\.'.join(pats) + r'\Z', re.IGNORECASE)
return pat.match(hostname)