1
0
mirror of synced 2026-01-10 09:02:35 -05:00

Update content/actions/learn-github-actions/security-hardening-for-github-actions.md

This commit is contained in:
Meg Bird
2021-06-28 08:10:51 -06:00
committed by GitHub
parent 2b64a88070
commit 476e7b1cbc

View File

@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ You should also consider the environment of the self-hosted runner machines:
- What sensitive information resides on the machine configured as a self-hosted runner? For example, private SSH keys, API access tokens, among others.
- Does the machine have network access to sensitive services? For example, Azure or AWS metadata services. The amount of sensitive information in this environment should be kept to a minimum, and you should always be mindful that any user capable of invoking workflows has access to this environment.
Some customers might attempt to partially mitigate these risks by implementing systems that automatically destroy the self-hosted runner after each job execution. However, this approach might not be as effective as intended, as there is no way to guarantee that a self-hosted runner only runs one job. Some jobs will use secrets as command line arguments which can be seen by another job running on the same runner, e.g. by running `ps x -w`. This can leads to secret leakages.
Some customers might attempt to partially mitigate these risks by implementing systems that automatically destroy the self-hosted runner after each job execution. However, this approach might not be as effective as intended, as there is no way to guarantee that a self-hosted runner only runs one job. Some jobs will use secrets as command-line arguments which can be seen by another job running on the same runner, such as `ps x -w`. This can lead to secret leakages.
## Auditing {% data variables.product.prodname_actions %} events